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I. INTRODUCTIOl\' 
The right to privacy just had its fortieth birthday. It has led a highly 
contentious life and, like many of the middle-aged, is currently going 
through a mid-life identity crisis. 1 The constitutional grandfather of the 
right to privacy-the right to contract-experienced a similar crisis and was 
summarily executed shortly after it reached its fortieth birthday,2 The pur-
pose of this paper is to explain why a similar fate should befall this illegiti-
mate grandchild3-the right to privacy, 
J.D., University of S1. Thomas School of Law, B.S.B.·Accounting, University of Minne· 
sota Carlson School of Management. I thank my wife Karen for her support of me through six· 
teen years of marriage and for the gift of our children. 
I. See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty 233 
(Princeton U. Press 2(04) (arguing that the Supreme Court has abandoned the right to privacy and 
substituted a "presumption of liberty"). 
2. Many might assume that the "right to contract" originated with Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 
45 (1905). However. on March I, 1897, the Court stated that the "'liberty' mentioned in [the 
fourteenth] amendment means, .. the right ... to enter into all contracts which may be proper. 
necessary. and essential ... ." Allgeyer v. La., 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). A little more than forty 
years later, on March 29, 1937, the Court stated that "[t]here is no absolute freedom to do as one 
wills or to contract as one chooses." W. Coast Holel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937). 
Although West Coast Hotel did not explicitly overrule Lochner, the Court indieated in 1992 that 
West Coast Hotel overruled the line of cases identified with Lochner. See Planned Parenthood I~r 
S.£. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 836 (1992). Both West Coast Hotel and Lochner identified 
Allgeyer as the first in the line of freedom of contract cases. W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.s. at 392 n.l; 
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. 
3. Justice Douglas attempted to distance his opinion from Lochner's paternity. Griswold 1'. 
Conn., 381 U.S. 479.482 (1965). However, his opinion relied upon at least two cases that had 
themselves relied ultimately on Lochner. fd. at 483 (citing Pierce 1'. Socy. of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925) and Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390 (1923)). Justice Black's dissenting opinion pointed out 
the majority's reliance upon the philosophy used in Lochner that was subsequently repudiated hy 
the Court. fd. at 514·16 (Black & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). For another discussion of the major· 
ity's reliance upon Lochner, see Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Legacy of Griswold, 16 Ohio N.U. 
L. Rev. 511, 516·17 (1989). 
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Ironically, the right to privacy was created in response to a claim that a 
married couple had a right not to create.4 This annunciation was originally 
known to but a few, as it was first expressed by a member of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman.5 Some of the 
other justices in that case were not yet ready to recognize the right to pri-
vacy, essentially arguing on justiciability grounds that it would be prema-
ture to let it be born.6 Four years later, however, when the state of 
Connecticut subsequently enforced its laws prohibiting contraception, the 
Court delivered this new right in Griswold v. Connecticut.7 The right in 
Griswold focused on "notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relation-
ship."8 Within twelve years, the right had been extended both to the unmar-
ried9 and to minors. 10 
The theoretical right to privacy espoused by academics II was actual-
ized by the Court in Griswold by means of a right to contraceptives. Thus, 
if one can show that the right to contraceptives can be banned due to com-
pelling state interests, we could determine that other rights that the Court 
has enunciated by relying on Griswold would rest upon a similarly shaky 
foundation. 
This paper will analyze the constitutionality of a hypothetical state-
wide ban on contraceptives. 12 First, it will review the Court's jurisprudence 
relating to contraceptives and specifically articulate the protected right. 
Then, it will establish the standard of review the Court would probably use 
to determine the constitutionality of a state's complete ban on contracep-
tives. Finally, this paper will show that such a ban should be upheld be-
cause the use of contraceptives-first protected as a fundamental right of 
privacy in Griswold-causes injuries to persons and abuses the legally pro-
tected institution of marriage. 
4. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("the right of pri-
vacy [is] embraced in the 'liberty' of the Due Process Clause"). 
5. [d. 
6. [d. 
7. 381 U.S. 479. 
8. [d. at 486. 
9. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
10. Carey v. Population Services [ntl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
II. One of the most famous academic articles espousing a broad understanding of the right-
though not a right to contraceptives-was published seventy-five years before Griswold. Samuel 
D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L Rev. 193 (1890). In his dissent-
ing opinion in Poe, Justice Douglas buttresses his argument that the Connecticut law was uncon-
stitutional by quoting Catholic theologian John Courtney Murray-who described the statute as 
"indefensible as a piece of legal draughtsmanship." 367 U.S. at 521 (Douglas, 1., dissenting) 
(quoting John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American 
Proposition 157-58 (Sheed & Ward 1960». It should be noted that Murray, nonetheless, consid-
ered the use of contraception to be a sin. [d. 
12. This paper will not evaluate the public policy wisdom of enacting such a ban; rather, it 
assumes that a state has banned all contraceptives for the reasons provided and then evaluates the 
constitutional validity of such a ban. That is, the question analyzed is not whether a ban should be 
enacted, the question analyzed is whether an enacted ban would be constitutional. 
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II. Is THERE A FUr-;DAMENTAL RIGHT TO CONTRACEPTIVES? 
In 1997, the Court noted that its established method in analyzing Four-
teenth Amendment "substantive-due-process cases [required] a 'careful 
description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest."13 The right of 
privacy recognized in Griswold does not neatly fit into this method of anal-
ysis. The opinion relied strongly upon the institution of marriage for its 
rationale in declaring unconstitutional Connecticut's law criminalizing the 
use or assistance in the use of "any drug, medicinal article or instrument for 
the purpose of preventing conception."14 However, the Court refrained 
from stating that there was a fundamental right to use or assist in using 
contraceptives. 15 Instead, it looked at a number of cases where state actors 
had restricted enumerated rights and concluded that the "cases suggest that 
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emana-
tions from those guarantees that help give them life and substance."16 The 
average reader may understandably be confused by that description of the 
liberty interest, because seven years after Griswold, the Court itself was 
unclear whether Griswold prohibited a state from enacting a ban on 
contraception. 17 
A year after Griswold, Massachusetts attempted to comply with the 
decision by adding an exception to its ban on contraceptives. The exception 
allowed a married person to obtain, from a physician, a prescription for 
"drugs or articles intended for the prevention of pregnancy or concep-
tion.'>l8 However, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court invalidated even this 
13. Wash. v. Glacksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citation omitted). 
14. Griswold. 381 U.S. at 480. 
15. fd. at 485 ('The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of 
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees."). 
16. fd. at 484. 
17. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 452-54. The Court passed on the question of whether the Massa-
chusetts statute could be upheld "simply as a prohibition on contraception" by stating H[w)e need 
not and do not, however, decide that important question in this case because, whatever the rights 
of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried 
and the married alike." fd. at 453. 
18. Ill. at 442 n. 2 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272. § 21A (1966)). The entire text of foot-
note 2 reads: 
Section 21 provides in full: 
'Except as provided in section twenty-one A, whoever sells, lends, gives away, exhibits 
or offers to sell, lend or give away an instrument or other article intended to be used for 
self-abuse, or any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever for the prevention of 
conception or for causing unlawful abortion, or advertises the same, or writes, prints, or 
causes to be written or printed a card. circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement or notice 
of any kind stating when, where, how, of whom or by what means such article can be 
purchased or obtained, or manufactures or makes any such article shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years or in jailor the house of 
correction for not more than two and one half years or by a fine of not less than one 
hundred nor more than one thousand dollars.' 
Section 21A provides in full: 
'A registered physician may administer to or prescribe for any married person drugs or 
articles intended for the prevention of pregnancy or conception. A registered pharmacist 
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amended Massachusetts law. 19 The law prohibited, among other things, the 
distribution to the unmarried of any "instrument or other article intended to 
be used for self-abuse, or any drug, medicine, instrument, or article 
whatever for the prevention of conception or for causing unlawful abor-
tion."20 Using an equal protection analysis in comparing the rights of mar-
ried and unmarried persons, the Court found that the statute was not 
rationally related to the state's asserted dual purposes to both protect "the 
health of its citizens" and "to protect morals" by discouraging marital infi-
delity and premarital sex.21 
The Court in Eisenstadt refused to conclude on the question of whether 
a state statute banning the distribution of contraception would be unconsti-
tutionaI,22 However, it certainly signaled that it would hold that way if 
presented squarely with the question. 23 In dicta, the Court quoted the lower 
court's opinion that legislation premised on the immorality of contracep-
tives would not only be "the very mirror image of sensible legislation; [it 
would] conflict[] with fundamental human rights."24 It then stated that 
"[iJf the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear 
or beget a child."25 Finally, although the opinion in Griswold could cer-
tainly be viewed as "no bar to a prohibition on the distribution of contracep-
tives," the Court in Eisenstadt made no attempt to defend that view.26 All 
of these words, however, were unnecessary to the Court's holding that the 
law violated the equal protection clause. 
actually engaged in the business of pharmacy may furnish such drugs or articles to any 
married person presenting a prescri ption from a registered physician. 
'A public health agency. a registered nurse, or a maternity health clinic opemted by or in 
an accredited hospital may furnish information to any married person as to where pro-
fessional advice regarding such drugs or articles may be lawfully obtained. 
'This section shall not be construed as affecting the provisions of sections twenty and 
twenty-one relative to prohibition of advertising of drugs or articles intended for the 
prevention of pregnancy or conception; nor shall this section be construed so as to per-
mit the sale or dispensing of such drugs or articles by means of any vending machine or 
similar device.' 
19. ld. at 440. 
20. ld. at 442 n. 2 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 21). 
21. !d. at 442-43. 
22. !d. at 453 ("[w]e need not and do not, however, decide that important question in this 
case because, whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights 
must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike"). 
23. ld. at 452-54. 
24. ld. at 453. 
25. Id. The seemingly inapposite inclusion of the word "bear" in this sentence has long been 
speculated to be an attempt to lay a foundation for the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 C.S. 
113 (1973). Roe was first argued before the Court less than a month after Eisenstadt and three 
months before the Eisenstadt decision was handed down. See John T. Noonan, Jr., A Private 
Choice: Abortion in America in the Seventies 21 (The Free Press 1979). 
26. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454. 
2005j GRISWOLD AT 40 479 
A year after Eisenstadt, the Court in Roe v. Wade stated that the "right 
of privacy, [if] it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of 
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, . . . is 
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate 
her pregnancy."27 The Court concluded that the right of privacy was "not 
unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regu-
lation."28 The Court also stated that "[w]here certain 'fundamental rights' 
are involved ... regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 
'compelling state interest,' ... and that legislative enactments must be nar-
rowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake."29 
In 1977, when the Court addressed a New York state law regulating 
contraception, it wrote that "the teaching of Griswold is that the Constitu-
tion protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified 
intrusion by the State."30 Although the Court discussed "the freedom to 
choose contraception," it specifically rejected the holding that "there is an 
independent fundamental 'right of access to contraceptives.' "31 However, 
it continued by stating that "such access is essential to exercise of the con-
stitutionally protected right of decision in matters of childbearing that is the 
underlying foundation of the holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and 
Roe v. Wade."32 
According to the Court at that time, access to contraceptives was not a 
fundamental right, but denying access would infringe upon a broader funda-
mental right. Drawing such a fuzzy line, however, does not meet the subse-
quently stated "careful description" requirement of Washington v. 
Glucksberg. 33 Additionally, subsequent cases have indicated that Griswold 
and its progeny "afford[ ] constitutional protection" to "the decision to use 
contraception."34 As argued by one commentator, the Court is struggling 
27. Roe. 410 U.S. at 153. 
28. Id. at 154. 
29. Id. at 155 (citation omitted). 
30. Carey, 431 U.S. at 687, 
31. 1£1. at 688. 
32. 1£1. at 688-89. I'm unable to let that quote pass without comment. Neither the Griswold 
nor the Eisenstadt opinions indicated that the "right of decision in matters of childbearing [was] 
the underlying foundation" of their holdings. As one commentator has pointed out, even plain-
tifrs counsel in Griswold disavowed that understanding at oral argument. "The Court specifically 
asked [counsell whether his theory would not invalidate state regulation of abortion. He replied 
that it would not since. unlike the contraception issue in Gri:rwold, abortion is less likely to lake 
place within the sanctity of the home, and a life in being apart from the married couple is af-
fected," Bloom, supra n, 3, at 533 n. 20 I. The Court in Eisenstadt explicitly grounded its holding 
on the equal protection clause. Although it may be impertinent of me to suggest that the Court 
was being dishonest either in the earlier cases or in Carey, this kind of hide-the-ball jurisprudence 
is beneath the Court, 
33. 521 U.S, at 720-21. 
34. Casey, 505 U,S. at 852; see Glucksberg, 521 U,S. at 763 (1997) (Souter, 1., concurring in 
judgment). 
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with two competing premises.35 On the one hand, the Court is interested in 
maintaining a presumption of constitutional validity for legislative enact-
ments that do not implicate fundamental rights. 36 On the other hand, the 
Court views itself as the protector of individual liberty, which encompasses 
more than just enumerated rights. As a result, the Court speaks of "liberty 
interests," but does not announce whether the particular liberty interest 
should be afforded fundamental rights status?7 
Nonetheless, it appears likely that in reviewing our hypothetical state 
ban on contraceptives, the Court would begin with the presumption that the 
ban infringed upon a fundamental right. Regardless of the specific articula-
tion, the Court has held that a state regulation of contraceptives could only 
be justified by a compelling interest "and must be narrowly drawn to ex-
press only those interests."38 Such an analysis is often described as "strict 
scrutiny. "39 
Ill. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING A STATE BAN ON 
CONTRACEPTIVES: A PROPOSAL BASED ON THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM 
STUDENT DIVERSITY, BAITFISH HEALTH, AND HOMOSEXCAL SODOMY 
Recently, the Court wrote that "[s]trict scrutiny is not 'strict in theory, 
but fatal in fact.' "40 That is, there are some circumstances in which state 
action subjected to strict scrutiny will nonetheless be considered constitu-
tional. Outside of abortion cases, however, where the Court has created the 
one-of-a-kind "undue burden" standard,41 the Court has provided little gui-
dance on how to analyze the constitutionality of state actions affecting sub-
stantive due process rights. As a result, it is necessary to review other 
regions of the Court's jurisprudence in order to come up with a framework 
for analyzing a hypothetical state ban on contraceptives. Unfortunately, 
there are very few cases where the Court's scrutiny was not "fatal in fact" to 
the state action. A review of two of those cases will help provide a frame-
work for predicting how the Court would analyze a state law banning con-
traceptives. Finally, the Court's recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas may 
confirm that the proposed framework is the correct one.42 
35. Barnett, supra n. I, at 224-69. 
36. Id. at 232-34 (referencing u.s. v. Caro[ene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938) and 
describing the analysis as "Footnote Four-Plus"). 
37. ld. at 254. 
38. Carey, 431 U.S. at 686. 
39. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
40. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (quoting Adm'and, 515 U.S. at 237). 
41. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 988 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, Scalia & Thomas, 11., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("The 'undue burden' standard is not at all the gener-
ally applicable principle the joint opinion pretends it to be; rather, it is a unique concept created 
speciaJJy for these cases, to preserve some judicial foothold in this ill-gotten territory."). 
42. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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A. The Equal Protection Clause Test: The Compelling Interest in Law 
School Student Diversity 
The University of Michigan Law School takes into account the race of 
a student applicant in evaluating whether to admit the student into the law 
schoo1.43 As the Court had previously explained, "whenever the govern-
ment treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that person has 
suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the 
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection."44 However, 
[w]hen race-based action is necessary to further a compelling 
government interest, such action does not violate the constitu-
tional guarantee of equal protection so long as the [action is nar-
rowly tailored to meet the government's interest].45 
Considering that racial discrimination was the primary evil that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to combat, it appears logical that a 
contraceptive ban should not be held to a higher level of scrutiny than state-
sponsored racial discrimination. Thus, if we substitute "a ban on contracep-
tives" for "race-based action" in the rule expressed in Grutter v. Bollinger, 
we have the strictest articulation of the level of review that the Court would 
use.46 
The Court indicated that the school's asserted compelling interest was 
"the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.,,47 It then 
listed a number of those benefits, such as "cross-racial understanding," pro-
motion of "learning outcomes," and professional preparation of "students 
for an increasingly diverse workforce and society."48 The Court determined 
that these benefits were compelling and concluded its analysis by stating 
that "[t]he Law School has determined, based on its experience and exper-
tise, that a 'critical mass' of underrepresented minorities is necessary to 
further its compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a di-
verse student body."49 
The Court then turned to an analysis of whether the law school's ad-
mission plan was narrowly tailored. In finding that it was, the Court ex-
plained that "[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every 
conceivable race-neutral alternative."50 The district court had found that 
the admissions plan was not narrowly tailored, partly because of the law 
school's refusal to reduce its emphasis on LSA T scores and undergraduate 
43. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 314. 
44. Id. at 327 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229-30). 
45. Id. 
46. /d. 
47. /d. at 328. 
48. Id. at 330. 
49. Id. at 333. 
50. Id. at 339. 
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GPA.S1 However, the Court rejected this argument because narrow tailor-
ing does not "require a university to choose between maintaining a reputa-
tion for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational 
opportunities to members of all racial groups."S2 
The state's asserted compelling interest had not been previously recog-
nized as such by the Court.53 Additionally, the Court's reluctance to re-
quire exhaustion of every conceivable alternative appears to be original to 
the Court's historical strict scrutiny jurisprudence. Although the newness 
of the Court's analysis led the dissent to conclude that the Court's scrutiny 
was not all that strict,54 it likely would be a mistake to believe that the 
Court would be as lenient with a state's asserted interest and tailoring of a 
ban on contraceptives. Additionally, because the equal protection clause is 
not the same as the due process clause, the Court could articulate a different 
rule for reviewing a state's ban on contraceptives. One possible framework 
would be the test used by the Court to determine whether a state has vio-
lated the dormant commerce clause. 
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause Test: The Legitimate Interest in 
Baitfish Health 
In 1986, the State of Maine's criminal ban on the interstate importation 
of baitfish was brought before the Court.55 The defendant, Robert J. Tay-
lor, argued that Maine's ban violated the principle of the dormant com-
merce clause-that a state can't "erect barriers against interstate trade."56 
Although the district court ruled against him, the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit found the statute to be unconstitutiona1.57 In reviewing the 
statute, the Supreme Court placed the burden of proof "on the State to 
demonstrate both that the statute 'serves a legitimate local purpose,' and 
that this purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory 
means."58 Importantly, the Court affirmed that the standard of proof for the 
trial court to apply was by a preponderance of the evidence. 59 
(n analyzing the state's interest, the Court subjected it to "the strictest 
scrutiny."60 The Court upheld the district court's finding that Maine 
51. ld. at 340. 
52, ld. at 339. 
53, Justice Powell opined that diversity could be a compelling interest, but he was the only 
Justice to argue that before Grutter. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265. 311-12 
( 1978). 
54. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
55. Me. v, Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
56, ld. at 137 (quoting Lewis v. BT Inv, Managers. Inc., 447 U,S. 27. 35 (1980)). 
57. ld. at 133. 
58. Id. at 138, 
59, Id. 
60. Id. at 144, As noted supra part III, there are very few cases where the Court has upheld 
legislation that was subjected to strict scrutiny, As a result, it is difficult to predict whether it 
would follow the same evidentiary standard and fact finder deference in a substantive due process 
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"'clearly has a legitimate and substantial purpose in prohibiting the impor-
tation of live baitfish,' because 'substantial uncertainties' surrounded the 
effects that baitfish parasites would have on the State's unique population 
of wild fish, and the consequences of introducing nonnative species were 
similarly unpredictable."61 That is, the state's interest in protecting fish 
health was strong enough to overcome "the strictest scrutiny." Addition-
ally, the Court upheld the district court's conclusion that "less discrimina-
tory means of protecting against these threats were currently unavailable."62 
In addition to the importance the Court placed upon protecting fish 
health, the case is also striking for the Supreme Court's reliance upon the 
district court for the "empirical component" of the strict scrutiny analysis.63 
Specifically, it held that "findings of fact made by the trial judge 'shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous.' "M It further noted "that no broader 
review is authorized here simply because this is a constitutional case, or 
because the factual findings at issue may determine the outcome of the 
case."65 Finally, the Court agreed that the state had "a legitimate interest in 
guarding against imperfectly understood environmental risks, despite the 
possibility that they may ultimately prove to be negligible."fifi 
Thus, if the state were to assert an interest at least as compelling as 
protecting the health of fish, and a trial judge were to find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that a ban on contraceptives accomplished those inter-
ests, the factual finding would not be set aside by the Court unless the 
finding was clearly erroneous. Additionally, based on the Court's analysis 
in this case, if a ban on contraceptives was the only means of protecting 
against the threats posed by contraceptives, the ban would not be 
overturned. 
Both of the standards of review used by the Court for equal protection 
clause cases and dormant commerce clause cases provide guidance for pre-
dicting the Court's methodology for reviewing a state ban on contracep-
tives. Additionally, the Court's plurality opinion in a part of Carey v. 
Population Services International67 and its recent decision in Lawrence v. 
Texw;68 may solidify our confidence in predicting how the Court would 
approach a constitutional challenge to a statewide ban on contraceptives. 
case as it did in a dormant commerce clause casco However, the Court did say that it was employ-
ing "the strictest scrutiny" in this dormant commerce clause case. If there is a level higher than 
"strictest" that is reserved specifically for substantive due proccss cases, the Court hasn't an-
nounced it yet. 
61. Jd. at 142-43 (quoting U.S. v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 397 (D.C. Me. 1984)). 
62. Id. at 143. 
63. Id. at 144. 
64. Id. at 145 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)). 
65. Id. at 145. 
66. Id. at 148. 
67. 431 U.S. 678. 
68. 539 U.S. 558. 
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C. A Proposal for a Substantive Due Process Test 
In the last of the three contraception cases, a plurality of the Court 
gave the most specific exposition of how it would analyze a state ban on 
contraceptives under the due process clause. The Court wrote, 
It is enough that we again confirm the principle that when a State, 
as here, burdens the exercise of a fundamental right, its attempt to 
justify that burden as a rational means for the accomplishment of 
some significant state policy requires more than a bare assertion, 
based on a conceded complete absence of supporting evidence, 
that the burden is connected to such a policy.69 
Although the judgment in this part of the decision was joined by a 
majority of the Court, the opinion garnered only a plurality. However, none 
of the Justices advocated a more stringent standard of review; they instead 
argued that the standard should be less strict. 70 This section of the Court's 
decision may therefore provide an outer boundary for the "strictness" of the 
scrutiny that the Court would employ in analyzing a state's interest in ban-
ning contraceptives. 
The Court may have recently provided a more definitive framework 
for substantive due process review. In Lawrence, the Supreme Court in-
voked the privacy right and gave it a much longer name-"the due process 
right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee 
of liberty."71 In finding Texas's same-sex sodomy prohibition unconstitu-
tional, the Court quoted from Justice Stevens's dissent in Bowers v. Hard-
wick,n and indicated that Stevens's analysis "should control here."73 The 
Court quoted these lines from Stevens's dissent: 
Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, 
the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally 
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason 
for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor 
tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from consti-
tutional attack. Second, individual decisions by married persons, 
concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even 
when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of "liberty" 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by 
unmarried as well as married persons.74 
69. Carey, 431 V.S. at 696 (plurality). 
70. See e.g. id. at 703 (Powell, J., concurring in part) ("I am not persuaded that the Constitu-
tion requires the severe constraints that the Court's opinion places upon legislative efforts to regu-
late the distribution of contraceptives, particularly to the young."). 
71. 539 U.S. at 575. 
72. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
73. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
74. /d. at 577-78 (emphasis added) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 216) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
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Even after Lawrence, however, the Court apparently still believes that 
"[t]here is no absolute freedom to do as one WillS."75 The limit to this 
freedom is nonetheless difficult to ascertain. But the Court did indicate 
that, "as a general rule, [it] counsels against attempts by the State, or a 
court, to define the meaning of [a personal] relationship or to set its bounda-
ries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects."76 
Arguably then, a fundamental right founded upon substantive due process 
liberty can be restricted by the state, at the least, if the exercise of that right 
causes either an injury to a person or abuses an institution the law protects. 
Although this "harm principle" has been strongly criticized by many com-
mentators,77 it appears to at least set an outer limit for an individual's exer-
cise of liberty. 
In summary, based on its own decisions, the Court would analyze a 
state ban on contraceptives in the following manner. First, individuals have 
a fundamental right to contraceptives. A state ban would obviously infringe 
upon that right. Therefore, the state has the burden of proving, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that the ban advances a compelling state interest. 
If the purpose of the ban is to prevent harm to persons and prevent abuse to 
the institution of marriage, either interest is compelling. Further, the ban 
must be narrowly tailored to accomplish those interests. Using this frame-
work, we can now analyze a state's compelling interests in banning 
contraceptives. 
IV. THE STATE'S COMPELLING INTEREST IN BANNING CONTRACEPTIVES 
The Court's decisions more than twenty-five years ago relied upon the 
understanding that "not all contraceptives are potentially dangerous.'os 
This conclusion arose without the presentation of evidence to that effect at 
either the state or federal court trial level. Instead, it appears to have been 
arrived at by the First Circuit Court of Appeals purely from the panel's own 
understanding of the medical question. The Supreme Court "joined" the 
court of appeals in taking judicial "notice" that the condom had been 
around for centuries and that they had "never heard criticism of it on the 
side of health."79 The Court "believe[d] that the same could be said of 
75. W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 392. 
76. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (emphasis added). 
77. John Stuart Mill wrote, "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." John 
Stuart Mill, On Liberty 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publg. Co. 1978). Mary Ann Glendon 
has criticized the use of this quote to advance a philosophy of relativism that Mill himself strongly 
rejected. Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law 121-25 (Harv. U. Press 
1987). Hadley Arkes has criticized this understanding of natural rights in a recent book. See 
generally Hadley Arkes, Natural Rights and the Right to Choose (Cambridge U. Press 2002). 
78. Carey, 431 U.S. at 690 n. 8 (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 451). 
79. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 452 n. 9 (quoting Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1401 (1st 
Cir. 1970». 
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certain other products."8o Underlying this belief was the Court's historical 
understanding that the contraceptive ban was enacted because the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts morally disapproved of contraceptives. That is, 
the intent of the people was not to protect the medical health of its citizenry. 
but to protect its morality. The Court's understanding was predicated upon 
the belief that the state's historical concern about sexual "morality" was in 
opposition to its concern for health,81 a historical premise that this paper 
will not endeavor to disprove. However, a review of the medical evidence 
will show that in the case of contraceptives, the traditional belief in the 
immorality of contraceptive use, enacted into law, protected the health of 
the citizenry. That is, the state's prohibition on contraceptives for moral 
reasons furthered-rather than opposed-its interest in health. 
A separate review of the sociological evidence will also show that a 
strong case can be made for linking the increased use of contraceptives to 
an abuse of the institution of marriage. Relying upon the Court's own em-
phasis on the importance of this institution to society, evidence proving that 
contraception has a devastating impact upon marriage should, in and of it-
self. be enough for the Court to find that the state has a compelling interest 
in banning contraceptives. 
This paper, however, is not an attempt to prove or disprove, to a scien-
tific certainty, the accuracy of every medical and sociological study regard-
ing the use of contraceptives. Instead, what is provided here is a summary 
of what the state could provide in proving, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, the state's health interest in banning contraceptives. Assuming that a 
fact finder found the evidence to be credible, a complete ban should then be 
upheld. 
A. The Harmful Health Effects from the Use of Contraceptives 82 
The COUlt has repeatedly said that the state has a compelling interest in 
protecting the health of its citizenry.83 This is one of the inherent police 
80. id. 
8t. See Baird. 429 F.2d at 1401 (,,[lIt is impossible to think of the [banJ as intended as a 
health measure. .. The legislature intended just the opposite."). To be fair to the court of 
appeals, this may have been inartful drafting. The court's main point was that the intent of the 
legislature was to morally disapprove of contraceptives. Nonetheless, it is clear that both the First 
Circuit and the Supreme Court appeared to believe that prohibiting contraceptives would be harm-
ful to health. rather than salutary, as the judicial fact finder actually found. Baird v. Eisenstadt, 
310 F. Supp. 951. 954 (D. Mass. 1970) ("It is a matter of common knowledge that contraceptive 
substances may have harmful effects on the health of those who use them .... "). 
82. Chris Kahlenbom and Ann MoeH have compiled a summary of some of the medical 
research in this area into a pamphlet titled What a Woman Should Know about Contraceptives that 
can be accessed at http://www.omsoul.com/pamphlet 160.What-a-Woman-Should-Know-about-
Contraception.html (accessed Nov. 14, 20(5). Much of the outline of this section was inspired by 
that pamphlet. 
83. See e.g. City (if Erie v. Pap's A.M .. 529 U.S. 277, 279 (2000) ("[T]he ordinance is within 
Erie's constitutional power to enact because the city's efforts to protect public health and safety 
are clearly within its police powers."). 
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powers of the state that justifies its regulation of such things as food, drugs, 
pollution, and nuclear energy. If a state were to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that all contraceptives present a risk of harming individual 
health, the Court should uphold the state's ban on contraceptives. This un-
questionably would be a much more difficult analysis for a court to perform 
than to simply conclude that "not all contraceptives are potentially danger-
OUS."84 However, that is the constitutional duty of the Court, to decide par-
ticular "cases and controversies."85 
Before analyzing the unintended health consequences of contracep-
tives, the argument can be made that most contraceptives (though arguably 
not barrier contraceptives) are intended to make a person unhealthy. That 
is, if they work as intended in destroying either a woman's or a man's fertil-
ity, they are intended to cause a person to be less healthy than they were 
before the use of the contraceptive. This argument relies upon a determina-
tion that infertility is objectively unhealthy. As such, the state has a com-
pelling interest in banning contraceptives if they function as intended. 
Under this argument, fertility is healthy and the "natural" or normal purpose 
of human sexuality is procreation.86 While some reject this natural law 
view, it is notable that few, if any, would argue that the primary purpose of 
insect sexuality is anything but procreation. The natural law has been the 
underlying conceptual foundation of such great philosophers as Aristotle, 
Augustine, and Aquinas. s7 An acceptance of it is evident in the Declaration 
of Independence. 88 There is much to commend in this argument based on 
natural law. In contemporary society, the extraordinary medical effort 
made to make persons fertile is just one item in support. 
However, this argument may rely, for some, too much on the natural 
law premise that fertility is the "normal" state of health for humans. Resis-
tance to this argument is highly ingrained in our culture, where pregnancy is 
treated as a disease to cureS9 and "reproductive health rights" becomes an 
Orwellian rallying cry supporting the legal right to impair fertility and cause 
abortions.90 Under this cultural construct, "health" is whatever the individ-
ual person thinks it is. That is, the determination of whether fertility is 
healthy or unhealIhy is purely subjective. There is some jurisprudential 
84. Carey. 431 U.S, at 690 n, 8 (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U,S. at 451). 
85. U.S. Const. art. III, ~ 2. 
86. See Janel E. Smith, HUmi/flat' Fitae: A Generation Later 73-83 (Cath. U. of Am. Press 
1991). 
87. ,'iee Renerally J, Budziszewski, What We Can't Not Know: A Guide (Spence Publg. Co. 
2(03). 
88. See The Avalon Project, Declaration of Independence, http://www,yale,edu/lawweb/ 
avalon/declare.htm (last updated Sept. 20, 2(05) ("the laws of nature and of nature's God"), 
89. Helen M. Alvan~. Catholic Teaching and The Law Concerning the New Reproductil'c 
Technologies, 30 Fordham Urb. L.1. J07, 112 (2002), 
90. See e.g. Barbara Mikulski, Prm'iding Women with the Support They Need (available at 
http://www.scnatorbarb.com/sitelPageServer?pagename=issues_ women) (accessed May 6. 2004) 
(uescribing contraception and abortion as "reproductive health"). 
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support for this view in the Court's "famed sweet-mystery-of-life pas-
sage"91 from Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey92: 
"At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, 
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."93 Such a 
construct would require that a state's determination of what health means 
could always be overridden by what an individual views health to mean, a 
construct that would eliminate health as a compelling state interest that 
could ever override an individual's liberty. 
The Casey mystery passage has not been used by the Court to support 
such a purely subjective understanding of health. Nonetheless, this paper 
recognizes that arguments premised upon the nature and purpose of humans 
and their sexuality would be starting from a premise that many, including 
the Court, possibly reject. Thus, we turn to the other health consequences 
of using contraceptives. 
Contraceptives can be categorized into five broad categories: hormo-
nal, barrier, spermicidal, intrauterine devices (IUDs), and sterilization. 
Some products are a combination of two of these categories, such as IUDs 
that release hormones. The three most common types of contraceptive 
techniques among women in the United States are hormonal (used by more 
than 31 % of contracepting women), barrier methods (more than 22%), and 
sterilization (more than 38%).94 This paper will analyze each in turn as 
well as IUDs and spermicides. 
1. The Pill and Other Hormonal Contraceptives 
"Had Baird [the defendant in Eisenstadt] distributed a supply of the so-
called 'pill,' I would sustain his conviction under this statute."95 Instead, 
Baird had distributed spermicidal foam, which the Court implicitly found to 
be harmless. Justice White's concurring opinion acknowledged explicitly 
what the majority opinion implicitly acknowledged. All of the Justices 
were on "judicial notice" that some contraceptives were potentially danger-
ous. By 1972, "[t]he Food and Drug Administration hard] made a finding 
that birth control pills pose possible hazards to health."96 Since that time, 
hormonal contraceptives have been reformulated and reconstituted in so 
many different ways that it is impossible to prove at anyone time that a 
particular pill or device is 100% safe. As a result, all of the more than forty 
hormonal contraceptive brands recently on the market include warnings of 
91. Lawrence. 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
92. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
93. ld, 
94. The Alan Guttmacher Inst., Contraceptive Use: Facts in Brief, http://www.guttmacher. 
org/pubs/fb_contr_use.html (accessed Sept. 20. 2005). 
95. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 463 (White & Blackmun. JJ., concurring in reSUlt). 
96. Id. at 463 n. 4. 
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their possible side effects.97 In addition to the side effects recognized by 
the FDA, there are numerous conflicting studies of other possible health 
consequences arising from the use of hormonal contraceptives. 
a. High Blood Pressure, Blood Clots, Stroke, Heart Attack 
One of the most popular oral contraceptives, Ortho Tri-Cyclen, notes 
in its informational materials that high blood pressure, blood clots, stroke, 
and heart attack are all possible side effects from using the product.98 Other 
side effects indicated in Ortho Tri-Cyclen' s materials include nausea, 
vomiting, and stomach pain.99 These additional side effects are not unique 
to the Ortho Tri-Cyclen brand, nor are they unique to the current formula-
tion of the pilL Each of these other side effects was also noted in the origi-
nal trials of the pill when it was tested on women in Puerto Rico in 1956. 100 
Although three young women died in the original Puerto Rico trials, the 
deaths were never investigated,IOI and the pill was approved for contracep-
tive use in 1960.102 
The year 2000 was a bad year for promoters of hormonal contracep-
tives. The British Medical Journal reported a study linking hormonal con-
traceptives containing desogestrel or gestodene to a 230% increase in the 
risk of blood clots. 103 A New Zealand study indicated that hormonal con-
traceptives may cause a nearly 1000% increase in the risk of developing a 
fatal pulmonary embolism. 104 Another study published in 2000 indicated 
that hormonal contraceptives led to increased stroke risk. 105 These studies 
just continued a long-standing pattern of indications for these dangerous 
side effects. They are noteworthy in that they continue to show that the 
risks of hormonal contraceptives are present even with the continuing modi-
fications to dosages. 
97. Matthew Bender & Co, 's Attorneys' Textbook of Medicine: Honnonal Contraceptives ch, 
18 pI. 311A.10 (3d ed .• LexisNexis Group 2004). 
98. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc., Ortho Tri-Cyclen Prescribing Information 4-5, http://www. 
ortho-mcneil.com/products/pilpdfs/cycltri.pdf (Mar. 2001). 
99. Id. at 3-5. 
100. Suzanne White Junod & Lara Marks, Women's Trials: The Approval of the First Oral 
Contraceptive Pill in the United States and Great Britain, 57 J. History Med. 117, 124 (Oxford U, 
Press 2002). 
101. American Experience, "The Pill" (PBS 1999) (motion picture, transcr. available at hltp:/I 
www.pbs.org/wgbhJamex/pill/filmmore/pLhtml). 
102. Junod & Marks, supra n. 100, at 133. 
103. Hershel Jick et aI., Risk of Venous Thromboembolism among Users of Third Generation 
Oral Contraceptives Compared with Users of Oral Contraceptives with Levonorgestrel Before 
and After 1995: Cohort and Case-Control Analysis, 321 British Med. 1. 1190 (Nov. II, 2000). 
104. Lianne Parkin et al., Oral Contraceptives and Fatal Pulmonary Embolism, 355 The Lan-
cet 2133 (June 17. 2000). 
105. J, F. Albucher et aI., Serum Lipids in Young Patients with Ischaemic Stroke: A Case-
Control Study, 69 J. Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psych. 29, 32 (July 2000). 
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b. Cancers 
The National Cancer Institute published a summary report on "Oral 
Contraceptives and Cancer Risk" that made the following points: 
• There is evidence of an increased risk of breast cancer for wo-
men under age 35 who are recent users of [oral contraceptives 
(OCs)]. 
• There is evidence that long-term use of OCs may increase the 
risk of cancer of the cervix. 
• There is some evidence that OCs may increase the risk of cer-
tain cancerous liver tumors.l06 
There have heen hundreds of studies looking for a link between hor-
monal contraceptives and cancer. There is no consensus on the impact. 
However, a state's burden of proof would be a preponderance of the evi-
dence, not proof to a scientific certainty. For example, if one researcher's 
meta-analysis is to be believed. "[e]ighteen of the twenty-one research stud-
ies done since 1980 on the connection between the Birth Control Pill and 
breast cancer showed that Pill users have a higher risk of breast cancer than 
non-users.''l07 Absent complete rebuttal of everyone of those eighteen 
studies, a fact finder could find that a state has a compelling interest in 
banning oral contraceptives. That is, a showing of any increased risk of a 
serious health detriment to one woman would be enough for a state to have 
a compelling interest. 
This statement is true because there is no articulated balancing test of 
how many women must die before the state is allowed to infringe on the 
right to contraceptives. Based on the Court's holdings that regulation of 
health falls clearly within a state's constitutional authority, and the Court's 
holding that baitfish health is a compelling interest, it appears reasonable to 
conclude that women's health is a compelling state interest that need not be 
balanced against the loss of the right to contraceptives. 
The argument could be made, however, that a state's interest in elimi-
nating the risk of one woman dying from cancer should not result in pre-
cluding all other women from using oral contraceptives. In fact, Justice 
Souter's concurring opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg suggests that 
106. ;\Iatl. Cancer Inst., Oral Contraceptives aud Cancer Risk. http://cis.nci.nih.gov/fact/3_13. 
hIm (Nov. 3, 2003). The other key point was, "Studies have consistently shown that using OCs 
reduces the risk of ovarian cancer." This paper does not reject the possibility that contraceptive 
use may have salutary health effects. However, the Court has acknowledged that the political 
branches are better suited to weighing health benefits against health risks than the judiciary, and 
that the Court's review of the legislative judgment on the balancing will use a reasonableness 
standard. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 752-89 (Souter, J., concurring). 
107. Chris Kahlenborn, Breast Cancer. Its Link to Abortion aud the Birth Control Pill 245 
(One More SOUl 2000): see The Polycarp Research Ins!., Overview: Breas/ Cancer and Om/ 
Contraceptives, http://www.polycarp.org/overviewbreastcancerora!contraceptives.htm (accessed 
May 9, 2004). 
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such a balancing analysis would have to be performed. lOll Citing Justice 
Harlan's dissent in the first contraceptive case l09 as authority, he thought it 
a "requirement that [the] Court balance 'the liberty of the individual' and 
'the demands of an organized society'" when conducting substantive due 
process analysis. llo He indicated that although a balancing must be done 
by the Court, "judicial review still has no warrant to substitute one reasona-
ble resolution of the contending positions for another, but [instead the Court 
has] authority to supplant the balance already struck between the contenders 
only when it falls outside the realm of the reasonable.""l The Court ap-
pears to be more likely to overturn, as unreasonable, "laws singling out a 
certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status or general hardships 
..•. "112 Presumably, if the democratic process resulted in a majoritarian 
decision to ban contraceptives for everyone, including the majority itself, 
the Court would consider the balance struck to be reasonable. 1 13 
Even if that presumption is incorrect, the Court simply has not articu-
lated how to balance these different interests. 114 As Justice Scalia wrote 
regarding the balancing test used for dormant commerce clause cases, "[i]t 
108. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 752-89 (Souter. 1., concurring). 
109. Poe. 367 C.S. at 551 (Harlan. J., dissenting). 
110. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 756 n. 4 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 
457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982)). 
III. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 764 (Souter. J .• concurring). 
112. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). 
113. This analytical principle was probably best annunciated by Justice Jackson in his concur-
ring opinion in Ry. Express Agency v. N. Y., 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949); 
I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal Government must 
exercise their powers so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon 
some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation. This equality is 
not merely abstract justice. The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not 
forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and 
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials 
would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens 
the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose 
only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribu-
tion that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no 
better measure to assure that laws will be just than 10 require that laws be equal in 
operation. 
114. The Supreme Court of Connecticut obliquely addressed whether a state was required to 
balance health against other factors six years before Griswold invalidated the state statute. Buxton 
v. Ullman, 156 A.2d 508, 514 (Conn. 1959). However, it determined that potential negative 
health consequences from a ban on contraceptives could be ignored if there were other alternatives 
that would eliminate the health risk. Accepting that contraceptives may be "the best and safest 
preventative measure" for a woman who would have a serious health risk from becoming preg-
nant, the Court nonetheless refused to overturn the Connecticut law. Id. The Court's rationale 
was fairly simple. The woman continued to have "another alternative, abstinence from sexual 
intercourse:' Id. For a contrary view that this was not a rational alternative. see Mary L. Dudziak. 
Just Say No: Birth Control in the Connecticut Supreme Court Before Griswold v. Connecticut, 75 
Iowa L. Rev. 915, 938 (1991) ("women in Connecticut [were] still unnecessarily dying because of 
the statute") (quoting Buxton. Birth Control Problems in Connecticut: Medical Necessity, Politi-
cal Cowardice and Legal Procrastination, 28 Conn. Med. 581. 583 (Aug. 1964). 
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is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock 
is heavy." I 15 
c. Depression, Loss of Fertility, Reduced Libido, Weight Gain, 
Migraines, and Other Side Effects 
Depression, loss of fertility, reduced libido, weight gain, and migraines 
are all commonly disclosed as potential side effects by manufacturers in the 
medical information sheet that accompanies hormonal contraceptives. II6 
Additionally, two studies published in 2001 linked hormonal contraceptives 
to lower bone mineral density 117 and a reduced ability to build spinal bone 
strength. I IS The Court has clearly indicated that "health" is within the con-
stitutional interests of the state. 1I9 There has been no indication made by 
the Court that these side effects alone would not be a compelling enough 
health consequence for the state to decide to ban hormonal contraceptives. 
In fact, Justice White's concurrence in Eisenstadt indicated that a "finding 
that birth control pills pose possible hazards to health" would be sufficient 
justification to uphold a ban on them.120 Because these admittedly adverse 
health consequences are conceded, there would be no need for a state even 
to prove its case. The state could therefore ban hormonal contraceptives 
under the Court's currently enunciated framework. 
d. Increased Susceptibility to HIV Transmission Risk 
A study of HIV-infected women published in the British Journal The 
Lancet indicated that women taking oral contraceptives are much more 
likely to have a detectable virus in the cervix or vagina than women who do 
not-leading to an increased risk of infection for their partners. 121 Another 
study published in 1996 showed that women have a 240% increase in the 
risk of contracting the HIV virus when they use an injectable progestin (like 
Depo-Provera) for contraception.122 A cohort study, reported in 2004, indi-
115. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, 
1.. concurring in judgment). 
116. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc., Ortho Tri·Cyclen Prescribing Information. http://www. 
ortho-mcneil.comlproducts/pi/pdfs/cycltri.pdf (accessed Sept. 9, 2005). 
117. Jerilynn C. Prior et aI., Oral Contraceptive Use and Bone Mineral Density in Preme· 
nopausal Women: Cross·Sectional, Population·Based Data from the Canadian Multicentre Osteo· 
porosis Study, 165 Canadian Med. Assn. J. 1023 (Oct. 16,2001). 
118. Connie M. Weaver et a!., Impact of Exercise on Bone Health and Contraindication of 
Oral Contraceptive Use in Young Women, 3:6 Med. & Sci. in Sport.~ & Exercise 873 (June 2001). 
119. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 279. 
120. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 463 n. 4 (White & Blackmun, 11., concurring in result). 
121. Sara B. Mostad et aI., Hormonal Contraception, Vitamin A Deficiency, and Other Risk 
Factors for Shedding of HIV·} Infected Cells from the Cervix and Vagina, 350 The Lancet 922 
(Sept. 27, 1997). 
122. See Kumnuan Ungchusak et aI., Determinants of HIV Infection among Female Commer· 
cial Sex Workers in Northeastern Thailand: Results from a Longitudinal Study, 12 1. Acquired 
Immune Deficiency Syndromes & Human Retrovirology 500 (1996). 
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cated that the contraceptives decrease peroxide-producing bacteria that help 
protect a woman from acquiring HIV.123 In light of the $15 billion that the 
federal government has committed "to fight AIDS abroad,"124 it is clear that 
tbe political branches believe that the state has a strong interest in reducing 
HIV transmission risk-a risk that these studies indicate is increased as a 
result of hormonal contraceptives. 
There are a number of demonstrated adverse health consequences from 
the use of hormonal contraceptives. At least two members of the Court 
have indicated that a state's ban on them for health reasons would be upheld 
by the Court. 125 A ban on other contraceptives for health reasons, however, 
would require a rationale that the Court has not heard. That argument is 
presented infra. 
2. Barrier Methods 
In addition to their demonstrated imperfect effectiveness as contracep-
tive devices,126 the availability of condoms and other barrier methods can 
have devastating health impacts. As explained in section IV.£'2 infra, there 
is a strong correlation between the availability of contraceptives and an in-
crease in non-marital sexual intercourse. An increase in non-marital sexual 
intercourse generally results in sexual activity with multiple partners. Be-
cause non-monogamous sexual activity, for at least one of the partners, is 
required for transmission, the increased availability of contraceptives 
should also have a strong correlation with an increase in sexually transmit-
ted diseases (STDs). Unsurprisingly, the evidence supports this as well. 
For example, between 1960 and 1970, the rate at which teenage females 
contracted gonorrhea tripled and the rate for teenage males doubled.127 Re-
searchers attributed this increase, at least in part, to increased sexual activity 
among youth over the time period. 128 
However, as skeptics are fond of saying, "correlation does not prove 
causation." What the skeptics forget to acknowledge, however, is that cor-
relation indicates causation. That is, when two things are correlated, the 
correlation is evidence (but not proof) of causation. Because the Court has 
held that the standard of proof under a strict scrutiny analysis is a prepon-
123. See Ludo Lavreys et aI., Hormonal Contraception and Risk of HIV-1 Acquisition: Results 
of a lO-year Prospective Study, 18 AIDS 695 (Mar. 2004). 
124. White House Press Release, President Signs HIVIAIDS Act (May 27, 2003) (available at 
http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003f05/20030527 -7. html). 
125. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 463 (White & Blackmun, 11., concurring in result). 
126. The Alan Guttmacher Inst., supra n. 94 (accessed Sept. 27, 2005) (condom failure rate in 
tirst year of use is 15%; diaphragm, cervical cap, and sponge failure rates in first year range from 
16% to 30%). 
127. Laurene Mascola et aI., Gonorrhea and Salpingitis among American Teenagers, 1960-
1981, (Centers for Disease Control 1983) (available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/ 
mmwrhtmI/OOOOI717.htm). 
128. [d. 
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derance of the evidence, the fact that there is no scientific study "proving" 
that the increased availability of contraceptives has led to an increase in 
STDs does not mean that a fact finder could not conclude that contraceptive 
availability has been one of the causes of STD growth in this country over 
the last forty years. That is, the fact finder could reasonably conclude that 
barrier contraceptives act as an inducement to participate in sexual activity 
that will have unhealthy consequences-consequences that the state has a 
compelling interest in preventing. 
Where the Court would end up on this question appears to depend 
almost entirely on where it begins. If the Court presumes, as it did in Ca-
rey, that the availability of contraceptives plays no part in the decision to 
have sex, then it is reasonable to conclude that denying barrier contracep-
tives to people will lead to an increase in STDs. Although the sexual activ-
ity would not be risk-free, it would be less risky than without a condom. In 
more conventional terms, "condoms are safe sex." But such an underlying 
premise is seen as faulty by many: 
Professionals and the public alike have been misled into believing 
that sex with a condom is safe . . . . We consider it irresponsible 
to suggest to anyone that condoms are entirely safe ... advising 
persons that it is safe to havc sex with condoms is false, provides 
an erroneous sense of security and can kill partners. 129 
Although medical journals have been reporting this for almost twenty 
years with regard to AIDS, and even longer with regard to other STDs,130 
the perception that condoms provide "safe sex" persists. 
What may be most troubling about the continued promotion of con-
doms as "safe sex" is that there is a cheaper, safer, and more effective alter-
native-periodic abstinence. Although abstinence is discussed in more 
detail in section V infra, there is a striking case study that directly links 
abstinence to lowered HIV transmission and implicitly rejects the condom 
as safe sex. 
a. What Happened in Uganda? 
In 1986, Uganda's new president Yoweri Museveni and his wife Janet 
Museveni spearheaded a campaign to combat a growing AIDS epidemic in 
the country. Known as "ABC," the campaign was simple: "Abstain, Be 
Faithful, and, if necessary, use a Condom." 13 I One of the most striking 
129. Am. Life League, The Condom: False Savior. in The Pro-Life Ency. 100 (1996) (availa-
ble at http://www.ewln.comllibrary/PROLENC/ENCYCIOO.htm). 
130. See Nicholas J. Fiumara, Effectiveness of Condoms in Preventing V.D., 285 New Eng. J. 
Med. 972 (Oct. 21, 1971) (Massachusetts Department of Public Health doctor stating that "the 
condom [is] useless as a prophylactic against gonorrhea, and even under ideal conditions against 
syphilis"). 
13 J. Dr. Anne Peterson, USAID Assistant Administrator for Global Health, Testimony. 
Before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations (May 19. 2003) 
(available at http://www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2003/ty030519.html). 
2005] GRISWOLD AT 40 495 
elements of the campaign was the minimization of condom marketing to all 
but a small minority of the population (in particular, sex industry workers 
and their clients). For the rest of the population, the emphasis was on ab-
staining outside of marriage and being faithful within marriage. As a result, 
the percentage of males aged 15-19 years who were virgins rose from 32% 
in 1989 to 55°10 in 1995.132 The percentage of females aged 15-19 years 
who were virgins rose from 28% to 45%.133 Additionally, the number of 
males reporting having at least one "casual" sex partner in the past twelve 
months dropped from 35% to 15% in the same six-year period. 134 The cor-
responding drop for women was from 16% to 6%.135 The resulting de-
crease in HIV prevalence among adults was similarly dramatic. Peaking at 
15% in 1991, the HIV prevalence had dropped to 5% by 2001. 136 
Although condoms were part of the program, the USAID study ac-
knowledged that "[nJearly all of the decline in HIV incidence (and much of 
the decline in prevalence) had already occurred by" the time more than 20% 
of the adult population ever used condoms. 137 Although each society is 
different, surrounding nations such as Zimbabwe, South Africa, Botswana, 
and Kenya have seen almost no change in their level of HIV incidence. In 
all of those countries, condom distribution was heavily emphasized. Con-
trastingly, until the mid-1990s in Uganda, "there was resistance on the part 
of the President and some religious leaders to promoting condom use 
...• " 13" Although none of this proves to a scientific certainty that condom 
distribution actually leads to an increase in the prevalence of HIV, scien-
tific certainty is not the standard of proof required for strict scrutiny analy-
sis. As discussed previously, if a fact finder concluded by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the availability of barrier contraceptives leads to an 
increase in the incidence of STDs, the state's compelling interest in 
preventing STDs would be enough for the Court to uphold a statewide ban. 
The conclusion that increased availability of barrier contraceptives 
leads to an increase in STDs is largely based on a sociological understand-
ing that the availability of contraceptives leads to sexual promiscuity. 
However, there has been at least one study that linked the use of barrier 
contraceptives directly to an increased risk for women of developing ad-






137. USAID, Project Lessons Learned Case Study: What Happened in Ugand<1? Declining 
HIV Prevalence, Behavior Change, and the National Response 8 (Janice A. Hogle ed" Sept. 
2002), In 1995, when HIV incidence leveled off, only 16% of males had ever used a condom. 
The rate for females was even lower, only 6%. /d. 
138. Id. 
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pregnancy.139 Pre-eclampsia is a syndrome of high blood pressure, fluid 
retention, and kidney damage that can lead to prolonged seizures and 
comas. 140 Another study gives the explanation for this link-repeated ex-
posure to semen increases a woman's immune capabilities. '41 An obvious 
rejoinder to using this study to support a ban on condoms is that there is no 
health risk unless the woman becomes pregnant. However, the rejoinder 
fails because, as discussed supra, the condom is not 100% effective in 
preventing pregnancy. Because of this fact, the use of a condom can be 
shown to be the direct cause of an increased risk of harmful health effects-
pre-eclampsia. 
3. "Permanent" Sterilization 
The discussion in section liLA. supra regarding infertility as objec-
tively unhealthy applies most forcefully in regard to sterilization. If a 
healthy reproductive system directed toward its purpose results in the pro-
creation of children, then sterilization would render that system unhealthy. 
This idea becomes obvious and non-controversial if we reformulate the pre-
vious sentence to refer to a "healthy ocular system" instead of a "healthy 
reproductive system." That is, if a healthy ocular system directed towards 
its purpose results in seeing, blinding a person would render that system 
unhealthy. If the state has a compelling interest in prohibiting health pro-
fessionals from blinding people who want to be blinded, the state would 
have the same interest in prohibiting health professionals in participating in 
sterilizations. 
Interestingly, the desire to permanently have oneself sterilized can be 
analogized to another desire that is currently viewed as a mental disorder-
body integrity identity disorder (BHD). Both situations involve the desire 
to take a normally functioning body and, through surgery, not have a part of 
the body function anymore. However, BHD-which was originally known 
as apotemnophilia from the Greek word meaning "to cut off,"-is the desire 
to amputate a healthy limb. 142 Although not yet addressed by the Supreme 
Court, it currently seems unlikely to this author that such a desire is a con-
stitutionally protected right.143 As discussed supra, this paper recognizes 
that others may think differently, especially with regard to sterilization. 
i 39. Hillary S. Klonoff-Cohen et ai., An Epidemiologic Study of Contraception and Preec-
lampsia, 262 I. Am. Med. Assn. 3143 (I 989). 
140. Kahlenborn & Moe\l, supra n. 82. 
141. Sarah A. Robertson et ai., Seminal 'Priming' for Protection from Pre-Eclampsia: A Uni-
fying Hypothesis, 59 J. Reprod. Immunology 253 (Aug. 2003). 
142. For a sympathetic and informative take on BUD, sec Body Integrity Identity Disorder, 
http://www.bUd.org (accessed Sept. 15,2005). 
143. Others are less sanguine about the constitutional prospects of sueh a right. See e.g. Wes-
ley 1. Smith, Taking Requests, Doillg Harm, http://www.nationalreview.eomleommentleomment-
smith072303.asp (July 23, 2003) (Natl. Rev. Online). 
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Thus, a discussion of the unintended adverse health consequences of sterili-
zation is necessary. 
Tubal ligation is not 100% effective as a contraceptive. 144 If a preg-
nancy does occur, tubal ligation is correlated with a much higher incidence 
of ectopic pregnancy,145 and is the leading cause of maternal death in the 
first trimester of pregnancy. 146 Additionally, the surgical procedure itself is 
subject to many adverse consequences. Included among these complica-
tions are bladder puncture, bleeding, and cardiac arrest. 147 Finally, tubal 
ligation can lead to a syndrome that causes the woman to experience inter-
mittent vaginal bleeding associated with severe cramping pain in the lower 
abdomen. 148 
There are also studies indicating that vasectomies have adverse health 
consequences. Several studies have linked vasectomies to an increased 
long-term risk of prostate cancer. 149 At least one other study found a 
higher-than-normal rate of vasectomies in men who had died from prostate 
cancer. 150 Additionally, nearly half of the men who have the operation will 
develop anti-sperm antibodiesYI That is, the man's body will develop 
cells that attack other cells in the body. Some have theorized that this may 
lead to a higher incidence of autoimmune disease. 152 
4. IUD 
One of the most popular brands of IUDs, the Dalkon Shield, was re-
moved from the market in the 1970s. Its manufacturer declared bankruptcy 
as a result of massive tort litigation claiming adverse health effects, includ-
ing death.153 Although newer forms of IUDs purportedly do not have the 
same effects, a state could reasonably be wary of the health consequences 
144. The Alan Guttmacher Inst., supra n. 94 (0.7% failure rate). 
145. Theodore 1. Gaeta et aI., Atypical Ectopic Pregnancy, 11 Am. 1. Emerg. Med. 233 (May 
1993). 
146. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Female Sterilization: Risk of Ectopic 
Pregnancy after Tubal Sterilization: Fact Sheet, http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/ 
UnintendedPregnancylEctopicPreg_factsheet.htm (accessed Sept. 26, 2005). 
147. H. P. Dunn, Unexpected Sequelae of Sterilization, 1:4 IntI. Rev. Nat. Fam. Plan. 318 
(Winter 1977). 
148. Duane E. Townsend et aI., Post-Ablation-Tubal Sterilization Syndrome, 82 Obstetrics & 
Gynecology 422, 423 (Sept. 1993). 
149. Edward Giovannucci et aI., A Retrospective Cohort Study of Vasectomy and Prostate 
Cancer in U.S. Men, 269:7 1. Am. Med. Assn. 878 (Feb. 17, 1993); Richard B. Hayes et aI., 
Vasectomy and Prostate Cancer in U.S. Blacks and Whites, 137:3 Am. 1. Epidemiology 263 
(1993); Lynn Rosenberg et aI., Vasectomy and the Risk of Prostate Cancer, 132:6 Am. 1. Epide-
miology 1051 (1990). 
150. Edward Giovannucci et aI., A Long-Term Study of Mortality in Men Who Have Under-
gone Vasectomy, 326 New Eng. 1. Med. 1392 (May 21, 1992). 
151. Rosenberg, supra n. 149, at 1055. 
152. Kahlenborn & Moell, supra n. 82. 
153. See William M. Brown, Deja vu All Over Again: The Exodus from Contraceptive Re-
search and How to Reverse It, 40 Brandeis L.1. I, 24 (2001). 
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arising from their continued use. Many current IUDs release hormones, 
making the IUD a hormonal contraceptive susceptible to the same health 
consequences arising from other hormonal contraceptives. 154 IUDs have 
also been associated with an increased incidence of pelvic inflammatory 
disease (PID).155 Thus, IUD manufacturers disclose this risk in their litera-
ture. 156 There are a host of adverse health consequences that have been 
linked to PID, including cramping, dyspareunia (painful intercourse), dys-
menorrhea (painful menstrual cycles), and infertility.157 
5. Spermicides 
A spermicidal foam was the contraceptive that Mr. Baird wanted to 
distribute in Eisenstadt v. Baird. 158 In overturning the state's ban on all 
contraceptives, a strong underlying theme of the Court's opinion was the 
belief that "not all contraceptives are potentially dangerous."159 However, 
there is little discussion in any of the Eisenstadt line of cases about the 
health impact of contraceptives in general and spermicides in particular. 
Although Eisenstadt asserted that the spermicide he distributed was "a safe 
and medically approved article," the district court stated that "(nJo such 
finding was made by the State courts (and] there is no basis in the record for 
such a finding by this Court."160 Both the First Circuit and the Supreme 
Court, without taking any additional evidence or remanding to the district 
court, implicitly made the very finding that the district court had rejected. 161 
Neither of the courts explained why the district court's findings should be 
ignored, but Justice White's concurrence implicitly argued that the state had 
the burden of proofl62-not the plaintiff, as the district court had found. 163 
154. See e.g. Berlex Laboratories, J.flRENA Patien{ Information, hup:/fwww.mirena-us.coml 
pdflmirena_ppi.pdf (2003). 
155. 2005 Physician Desk Reference 1936-39 (Thomson Healthcare 2004); Stephen D. 
Mumford & Elton Kessel, Was the Dalkon Shield a Safe and Effectivl' Intrauterine Device? 771e 
Cofltlict hetwePfl Case-Control and Clinical Trial Study Findings, 57:6 Fertility & Sterility 1151 
(June 1992). 
156. Berlex Laboratories. supra n. 154. 
157. [d. 
158. 405 U.s. at 440. 
159. [d. at 451. 
160. Eisenstadt, 310 F. Supp. at 954 n. 4 (D. Mass. 1970). 
161. Baird, 429 F.2d at 140\ (1st Cir. 1970) ("'we must take notice that not all contraceptive 
devices risk 'undesirable .. , [or] dangerous physical consequences"') (internal quotation not cited 
in original), 
162. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 464 (1972) (White & Blackmun, 11., concurring in result) ("to 
sanction a medical restriction upon distribution of a contraceptive not proved hazardous to health 
would impair the exercise of the constitutional right"). Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, pointed 
out that White' s requirement upon the state to prove the health hazards in order to justify the 
contraceptive ban had "never been placed in issue in the state or federal courts." Eisenstadt, 405 
U.S. at 469-470 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). 
163. Eisenstadt, 3]() F. Supp. 95 L 
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As a result, the adverse health consequences arising from spermicides were 
never actually presented to a fact finder. 
Since that time, there has been at least one study linking spermicides to 
a doubled increase in the risk of birth defects and the rate of miscarriage for 
women who conceive within a month of using a spermicide. 1M Addition-
ally, Toxic Shock Syndrome has been associated with the spermicidal 
sponge. 165 The risk of these extremely serious health consequences, if 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence, would certainly be enough to 
meet the compelling interest standard and overcome the Court's implicit 
presumption that all contraceptives are healthy unless proven otherwise. 
Many risks of serious health consequences have been associated with 
all five general categories of contraceptives. Some of these risks were ei-
ther unknown or not brought before the Court when it decided the contra-
ception cases. If a state were to now reenact a complete ban on 
contraceptives, it could present this evidence in support of its compelling 
interest in protecting its citizens' health. Assuming that the fact finder de-
termined that the evidence showed that these health risks were real, then the 
Court would have to uphold the state's ban on contraceptives. 
B. Contraceptive Use Abuses the Institution of Marriage 
In June of 2003, the Court intimated that the state can act to restrict an 
individual's liberty when that individual's action injures a person or abuses 
an institution the law protects. 166 As discussed supra in Section IV.A., the 
use of contraceptives injures a person. This section will show that the use 
of contraceptives abuses the institution of marriage, an institution the law 
has long protected. 
Over a century ago, the Court described marriage as "the most impor-
tant relation in life."167 It went on to characterize it as "the foundation of 
the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization 
nor progress." 168 In the earliest cases relied upon by the Court in Gris-
wold,169 the Court stated that the right "to marry, establish a horne and 
bring up children" is a liberty guaranteed by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 170 Although the Justices in Griswold were careful 
to keep the three elements-marriage, home, and children-of the Meyer 
Court's formulation together, subsequent cases began to treat them sepa-
164. Hershel lick et aI., Vaginal Spermicides and Congenital Disorders, 245 l. Am. Med. 
Assn. 1329 (1981). 
165. G. Faich et aI., Toxic Shock Syndrome and the Contraceptive Sponge, 255 J. Am. Med. 
Assn. 216 (1986). 
166. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
167. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). 
168. [d. at 211. 
169. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-83. 
170. Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390. 399 (1923). 
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rately.'71 In so doing, the Court has undermined the rationale for why mar-
riage is "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race" -and 
that rationale is the raising of children. 172 
If the raising of children is separated from the institution of marriage, 
it is hard to understand why marriage would still be important to society. 
The Court in Lawrence indicated that the state does not have an interest in 
favoring one sort of consensual adult relationship over another. 173 Al-
though the Court implicitly disclaimed the conclusion that same-sex mar-
riages must be allowed,174 Justice Scalia forcefully rejected the argument 
that the Court's reasoning could lead to any other conclusion. 175 But Jus-
tice Scalia is wrong. Although "the promotion of majoritarian sexual mo-
rality" may not be "a legitimate state interest," 176 the Court never claimed 
that the raising of children is not. As a result, it could be argued that the 
only reason society still has a "legitimate" interest in marriage is because 
society still has an interest in how children are raised. But contraception 
intentionally separates marriage from children, by separating sex from the 
procreation of children. And the result of that separation has led to a degra-
dation of marriage. 
Sex is like nuclear energy.177 Properly channeled and regulated, it 
produces abundant good for humanity. Predominant among those many 
goods of sex is the creation of children-creation that is required for our 
very existence and survival. However, it also has great potential to do 
harm. When left unregulated, it can cause all sorts of damage, which is 
why there have been laws criminalizing fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult 
incest, bestiality, and obscenity throughout our nation's history. 178 For this 
same reason, societies throughout history have channeled sex into marriage 
and then regulated that relationship. To suggest that private, consensual sex 
can be decoupled from marriage is akin to suggesting that private use of 
nuclear energy should be unregulated. Hardly anyone would contest the 
regulation of nuclear energy. However, the Court's action in Griswold not 
only contested such a regulation of marriage, it prohibited it. That prohibi-
171. 7£Jblocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384-86 (1978) (citing Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Ca-
rey to support the conclusion that there is a fundamental "right to marry" and that there are sepa-
rate fundamental rights in "decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family 
relationships"). 
172. Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
173. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("[Petitioners' J right to liberty under the Due Process Clause 
gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the governmenL"). 
174. [d. ("[The present casel does not involve whether the government must give fonnal rec-
ognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enteL"). 
175. !d. at 604 (Scalia, J., Rchnquist, CJ., & Thomas, J., dissenting) (responding to majority's 
comment quoted supra 0, 174 with the statement: "Do not believe it."). 
176. Id. at 599 (italics omitted). 
177. Jordan Lorence. litigator for the Alliance Defense Fund, is the first person that I heard 
make this analogy. 
[78. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.1., & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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tion has had devastating effects on society in general, and the institution of 
marriage in particular. 
In 1968, Pope Paul VI issued his encyclical on the regulation of birth 
entitled Humanae Vitae (Human Life).179 In it, he confirmed the Church's 
ancient and consistent teaching that contraceptive sex "contradicts the 
moral order" and is "intrinsically wrong.,,180 Additionally, he warned of 
the "consequences of artificial methods" that would result if the Church's 
teaching was rejected. 181 These consequences have been described as "pre-
dictions" by many authors,182 and this paper will show that they have 
largely come true. 
1. Contraception and an Increase in Divorce 
More than one study has linked contraceptive availability to an in-
crease in the divorce rate. In 1977, a researcher at Stanford University re-
leased a preliminary study for the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 183 Studying divorce rates from 1920 to 1974, the empirical data 
showed that divorce rates had gradually increased over the first forty-five 
years of the study and then doubled over the final ten years beginning in 
1965, the year Griswold was decided. 184 The paper went on to predict that 
the divorce rate would flatten in the future,185 a prediction that has been 
largely accurate. 186 The study attributed about 47% of the increase in di-
179. Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae (July 25, 1968) (available at hllp:!lwww.vatican.valholy_ 
father!paul_ vi!encyclicals!documentsIhCp-vi_enc_25071968 _humanae-vitac _en.html). 
180. Id. at § 14. 
181. Id. at § 17. The first paragraph of § 17 reads in full: 
Responsible men can become more deeply convinced of the truth of the doctrine laid 
down by the Church on this issue if they reflect on the consequences of methods and 
plans for artificial binh control. Let them first consider how easily this course of action 
could open wide the way for marital infidelity and a general lowering of moral stan-
dards. Not much experience is needed to be fully aware of human weakness and to 
understand that human beings-and especially the young, who are so exposed to temp-
tation-need incentives to keep the moral law, and it is an evil thing to make it easy for 
them to break that law. Another effect that gives cause for alarm is that a man who 
grows accustomed to the use of contraceptive methods may forget the reverence due to a 
woman, and, disregarding her physical and emotional equilibrium, reduce her to being a 
mere instrument for the satisfaction of his own desires, no longer considering her as his 
partner whom he should surround with care and affection. 
182. See e.g. Janet E. Smith, Paul Vi as Prophet in Why Humanae Vitae was Right: A Reader 
519 (Janet E. Smith ed. Ignatius Press 1993). 
183. Roben T. Michael, Two Papers on the Recent Rise in U.S. Divorce Rates, NBER Work-
ing Paper No. W0202 (Sept. 1977). 
184. Michael, Anatomy olthe Divorce Rate: /960-1974 in Two Papers on the Recent Rise in 
U.S. Divorce Rates, supra n. 183, at 6A, tbl. I. 
185. Michael, Why Has the U.S. Divorce Rate Doubled Within the Decade? in Two Papers on 
the Recent Rise in U.S. Divorce Rates, supra n. 183. at 22-23. 
186. The "divorce rate" is a very elusive number, because of the difticulty of tracking individ-
ual marriages over time. However, the census bureau has been tracking the number of reponed 
divorces in a single year since at least 1950. In 1950, the rate was 2.6 divorces per 1,000 popula-
tion. In 1965, it was 2.5. By 1975, it had nearly doubled to 4.8. It remained within a narrow 
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vorce rates between 1965 and 1974 to the technological improvement and 
societal diffusion of contraceptives, particularly the pill and IUDs. 187 
In 1960, only four years after the pill was first tested on humans, re-
searchers found that marriages in which contraceptives were used were 
twice as likely to end in divorce as marriages in which there was no contra-
ceptive use. 188 Other anecdotal evidence suggests that couples using a non-
contraceptive method of birth control are as much as five times more likely 
to have never divorced. 189 
Another social scientist, Francis Fukuyama, has written on the impact 
of birth control in causing "The Great Disruption" in western society.190 
Citing "the breakdown of the nuclear family after the 1960s in the West" as 
one aspect of the great disruption,191 he concludes that two related factors, 
birth control and the movement of women into the labor force, are largely 
responsible for the breakdown. 192 Fukuyama does not argue that either wo-
men or men are primarily responsible for this breakdown, but does argue 
that the pill and the sexual revolution dramatically altered male behavior. 193 
In particular, he argues that men have changed their traditional calculation 
of trading something they were reluctant to partake in-marriage and fa-
therhood-for something that they have always wanted-sexual satisfac-
tion. 194 As a result of this changed calculation, marriage is less likely to 
occur because of pregnancy and also less likely to be maintained. 195 
Pope Paul VI predicted this consequence. In 1968, he wrote, 
A man who grows accustomed to the use of contraceptive meth-
ods may forget the reverence due to a woman, and. disregarding 
her physical and emotional equilibrium, reduce her to being a 
mere instrument for the satisfaction of his own desires, no longer 
considering her as his partner whom he should surround with care 
and affection. 196 
range of 4,7 to 5,3 for the next twenty years, US, Census Bureau, 2003 Statistical Abstract (~f the 
U,S,: Table 83, 
187. Michael, supra n. 184. at 16B. tbl. 5 (3.728 + 7.978 = 46.73%). 
188, See fienerally Ellen Grant, Sexual Chemistry: Understanding Our Hormones, the Pill alld 
HRT (William Heinemann Ltd. 1996). 
189, Mercedes Arzti Wilson, The Practice of Natural Family Planning Versus the Use of 
Artificial Birth Control: Family. Sexual and Moral Issues in Catholic Social Science Review, 7 
Catholic Soc. Sci. Rev. 185, 200 (Nov. 2002) (available at http://www.familyplanning.netlindex-
home.html; select Important New Study on NFP Published by the Catholic Social Science 
Review). 
190, Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of So-
cial Order (Free Press 1999). 
191. !d. at 95. 
192. {d. at 101. 
193, ld. at 102. 
194. See id. 
195. {d. at 102-03. 
196. Pope Paul VI, supra n. 179, at § 17. 
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There can be no greater abuse of the institution of marriage than to 
take actions that lead to its dissolution. The strong scientific, sociological, 
and philosophical evidence that contraception abuses the institution is a 
compelling reason for why a contraceptive ban should be upheld by the 
Court. Even with this evidence, however, the Court may be unwilling to 
uphold a ban because it does not understand why contraception leads to 
divorce. But there is ample evidence that explains the link-specifically, 
the evidence that contraceptive availability leads to extramarital sex. 
2. Contraception and the Increase in Premarital and Extramarital 
Sex 
It is futile to hope that the use of contraceptives will be restricted 
to the mere regulation of progeny. There is hope for a decent life 
only so long as the sexual act is definitely related to the concep-
tion of precious life. This rules out perverted sexuality and to a 
lesser degree promiscuity. Divorce of the sexual act from its nat-
ural consequences must lead to a hideous promiscuity and to con-
doning if not endorsing natural vice. 
-Mohandas Gandhi 197 
Responsible men can become more deeply convinced of the truth 
of the doctrine laid down by the Church on this issue if they re-
flect on the consequences of methods and plans for artificial birth 
control. Let them first consider how easily this course of action 
could open wide the way for marital infidelity and a general low-
ering of moral standards. Not much experience is needed to be 
fully aware of human weakness and to understand that human be-
ings-and especially the young, who are so exposed to tempta-
tion-need incentives to keep the moral law. and it is an evil 
thing to make it easy for them to break that law. 
-Pope Paul VI I98 
Contrary to Gandhi and Pope Paul VI, the Supreme Court has ex-
pressed its belief that "there is no evidence that teenage extramarital sexual 
activity increases in proportion to the availability of contraceptives." 199 In 
one sense, the Court was absolutely correct: there was no evidence 
presented to it that linked the availability of contraceptives to increased 
extramarital sexual activity. Although the Court could have taken judicial 
notice of the common sense understandings articulated by two of the most 
prominent persons of the twentieth century who addressed the topic, they 
197. Quoted by Philip F. Lawler, The Price of Virtue, 7 Catholic World Rpt. 55 (July 1997). 
198. Pope Paul VI, supra n. 179, at * 17. 
199. Carey, 431 U.S. at 695 (Brennan, J., plurality in part IV), 
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did not. The failure to take such judicial notice, however, does not mean 
that there is no evidence. It just means that none was presented. 
It is likely that the Court could be persuaded that extramarital affairs 
lead to divorce. The link appears obvious. In a 1998 poll, only 12% of 
adults agreed with the statement: "Extramarital love affairs are acceptable 
under certain circumstances."200 In the same poll, 64% agreed that "di-
vorce is an acceptable solution if two people are unhappy in marriage." A 
huge majority believe that affairs are unacceptable. If "unacceptable" be-
havior by one partner leads to unhappiness in marriage, then a nearly 2 to 1 
majority would see divorce as a solution to the extramarital love affair. But 
perhaps such plodding, methodical logic is unnecessary. Simply ask most 
married persons the following question: "If your spouse had an extramarital 
affair, would that make you unhappy?" The overwhelming majority would 
essentially answer, though perhaps more colorfully, "Yes." Assuming that 
the Court would agree that extramarital affairs lead to divorce, it should be 
convinced that contraceptives lead to divorce if contraceptives also lead to 
extramarital affairs. 
The Court may be persuaded of that conclusion by the writings of a 
former academic and current Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals judge Rich-
ard Posner. Directly contradicting the opinion in Carey, Posner wrote that 
contraceptive "availability increases the frequency of intercourse by teenag-
ers .... H20] In the same book, which was cited by the Court alternatively in 
both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Lawrence,202 Posner cited 
"evidence that the availability of contraceptives indeed increases the 
amount of non-marital sex."203 One of the sources he cited found that 
"there appears to be clear evidence of an increase in coital frequency be-
tween 1965 and 1970."204 
A more comprehensive study of sexual behavior in the United States 
was published in 1994. The researchers determined that there were a num-
ber of statistically significant correlations. The study indicated that "men 
and women who had a sex partner before age eighteen were more likely to 
form an informal cohabitational relationship than a formal marriage."2os It 
then showed that "[t]hose who began their partnership as a cohabitation and 
then converted it to a formal marriage had a much higher likelihood of 
separation ... than those who did not begin their partnership with a cohabi-
200. Humphrey Taylor, The Harris Poll #14: Differences in American and Japanese Attitudes 
to Extramarital Sex, Divorce-and Princess Diana, http://www.harrisinteTactive.comfharris_poIl/ 
index.asp?PID=193 (Mar. II, 1998). 
201. Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 270 (Harv. U. Press 1994). 
202. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576, 589. 
203. Posner, supra n. 201, at 265 n. 7. 
204. Charles F. Westoff, Coital Frequency and Contraception, 6:3 Fam. Plan. Perspectives 
136 (Summer 1974). 
205. Edward O. Laumann et aI., The Social Organization of Sexuality: Sexual Practices in the 
United States 493 (U. of Chi. Press 1994). 
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tation."206 Linking all these findings together, there is evidence that contra-
ceptives lead to a higher frequency of teenage sexual activity, which leads 
to an increase in cohabitational partnerships, which leads to a much higher 
likelihood of divorce. In short, contraceptive availability leads to 
divorce.207 
None of this evidence conclusively proves, to a scientific certainty, 
that increased contraceptive availability leads to divorce and an abuse of the 
institution of marriage. But the state's actions are not held to that standard 
of proof. Instead, the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. 
Both science and philosophy support the conclusion. A reasonable fact 
finder certainly could as well. 
V. NATURAL FAMILY PLANNING AS A BETTER ALTERNATIVE: WHY A 
BAN ON CONTRACEPTiVES WOULD BE NARROWLY TAiLORED 
AND THE LEAST RESTRiCTIVE MEANS 
The bulk of this paper is devoted to showing that the state has a com-
pelling interest in banning contraceptives. In most respects, the analysis of 
whether a state law banning all contraceptives is narrowly tailored or the 
least restrictive means available is dependent upon the conclusions reached 
about the state's interests. That is, if the premise were accepted that the 
political branches have the authority to determine whether the health risks 
from a certain contraceptive product are enough to prohibit its distribution, 
then a ban on those products shown to be a health risk would be narrowly 
tailored. The ban would be neither over- nor under-inclusive; instead, the 
ban would exactly meet the state's interest in protecting health. Similarly, 
if the political branches have a separate compelling interest in protecting the 
institution of marriage, and those branches found that all contraceptives are 
an abuse of that institution, then a ban would perfectly meet the state's 
asserted interest in protecting marriage. 
Undoubtedly, however, there would be objections. First, one could 
argue that the determination that citizen health and protection of marriage 
are compelling interests is not the end of the analysis. Rather, we should 
accept Justice Souter's contention that substantive due process analysis in-
volves a weighing of the state's compelling interest against an individual's 
asserted liberty right. 208 However, even if we were to accept that conten-
tion, Justice Souter would adopt a highly deferential standard toward the 
state's compelling interest-as long as the balance struck by the political 
branches is reasonable, the law should be upheld. As discussed supra in 
206. Id. at 50 I. 
207. Note that the study did not evaluate nor conclude, to a scientific certainty, that contracep-
tive availability leads to divorce. Instead, it concluded that each of the steps in one of my hypoth-
esized chains of causation was proved to a scientific certainty. The U.S. Constitution, of course, 
does not require a scientific certainty. 
208. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 752-89 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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Part IV.A.I.b., the Court is reluctant to overturn, as unreasonable, laws ap-
plied equally to everyone.209 
Another objection to a comprehensive ban would be the lack of an 
exception for health reasons. For example, if a married woman risked se-
vere health consequences from becoming pregnant, a ban would arguably 
be unreasonable for her because she would be at a much higher health risk 
from getting pregnant than from the contraceptive itself. The Supreme 
Court of Connecticut addressed this objection in a state challenge to the law 
eventually overturned in Griswold. In Buxton v. Ullman, the Court rejected 
the objection by telling the plaintiff that she had an alternative-absti-
nence. 2lO Although this may seem overly harsh upon first reading, periodic 
abstinence is the basis of a safe, free, effective, and marriage-building alter-
native available to everyone, and it is called natural family planning (NFP). 
A comprehensive discussion of NFP is beyond the scope of this article. 
However, it can be summarized fairly simply. A woman's body undergoes 
changes at the time of ovulation. Two easily observable changes are the 
woman's body temperature and the consistency and quantity of her cervical 
mucus. By consistently charting these changes on a daily basis, a woman 
can accurately predict whether she is fertile on a given day. If she wants to 
avoid pregnancy on a day that she is fertile, she is abstinent. One study 
found an applied effectiveness rate of over 99.5% for NFP.211 The partici-
pants in the study were the poor women in the slums of Calcutta. Unedu-
cated and impoverished, they were taught NFP for virtually no cost. 
Numerous other studies have shown an effectiveness rate over 99%?12 
There also is anecdotal evidence that NFP users get divorced at a much 
lower rate than non-users?13 
In short, the availability of NFP and the "perfect fit" between a com-
prehensive ban on contraceptives and the state's compelling interest in both 
health and marriage makes a ban both narrowly tailored and the least re-
strictive means to meet the state's interest. Any exception would subject 
citizens to health risks the state reasonably wants to avoid. Additionally, 
any exception would lead to an abuse of the institution of marriage, because 
209. See Lawrence. 539 U.S. at 579-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
210. 156 A.2d at 514. 
211. A. K. Ghosh, S. Saha & G. Chattergee, Sympto-thermia vis-a-vis Fertility Control, 321. 
Obstetrics Gynue India 443 (1982); R. E. 1. Ryder, "Natural Family Planning": Effective Birth 
Control Supported by the Catholic Church, 307 British Med. 1. 723 (993). 
212. See John Kippley, The Effectiveness of Natura I Family Planning, Part 2-Method Effec-
tiveness. http://cC\i.org/nfplbasics/effectiveness-p02.php (accessed Nov. 21, 2005) (referencing 
tlve different studies). 
213. The Couple to Couple League, Marital Duration and Natural Family Planning, http:// 
ccJi.org/nfp/marriage/maritalduration.php (accessed Sept. 22, 2005); Elzbieta Wojcik, Natural 
Regulation o.fConception and Contraception in Why Humanae Vitae was Right: A Reader, supra 
n. 182, at 431-32. 
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the state can reasonably conclude that the availability of contraceptives 
leads to a higher incidence of divorce. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The constitutional case for a complete state ban of contraceptives is 
strong. Given the demonstrable adverse health consequences that can be 
either directly or indirectly attributed to them, a ban should be upheld. A 
separate case for a ban based on the state's interest in protecting marriage 
due to the strong correlation between the availability of contraceptives and 
the rapid breakdown of the institution of marriage is equally compelling. If 
a state were to enact a comprehensive ban on contraceptives for the reasons 
set forth in this article, the Court should uphold the judgment of the peo-
ple's democratically elected representatives.214 
However. this author does not harbor any illusions about the current 
prospects of passing such a statewide ban on contraceptives. There are sim-
ply too many people at this time that "want their MTV"215 and are not 
willing to give up their Court-provided license to have sex divorced from its 
procreative nature. But as the increasingly severe natural consequences of 
that divorce become clearer, opinion will change. When that time comes, 
the Supreme Court should be willing to hear the facts, and allow the peo-
ple-acting through the political branches-to rule themselves. 
214. lust because the Court should, however, doesn't mean that it would. It might decide that 
because there are so many "people who have ordered their thinking and living around that case," it 
can't be overturned. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856. Such a strong devotion to stare decisis, however, 
appears to have been recently abandoned by the Court in Lau'rence v. Texas. 539 U.S. at 586-87 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). For a humorous take on how another case would have been decided if the 
Court actually believed that reliance interests required the Court to uphold unconstitutional acts, 
see Michael Stokes Paulsen & Daniel N. Rosen, Brown. Casey-Style: The Shocking First Draft of 
the Segregation Opinion, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1287 (1994). 
215. One of the most popular videos in the early period of MTV was created by the band Dire 
Straits. In the background of the video could be heard the line, repeated over and over, "} want 
my MTV." That background line has become a euphemistic substitute for another line in the 
song, "Money for nothin' and chicks for free." Dire Straits, The Videos: Money for Nothing 
(Warner Bros. 1993) (music video). 
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